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THE QUESTION OF TAXING CAPITAL GAINS
I. THE CASE FoR TAXATION'
ArTnut H. KNT*
The issue as to the proper mcthod of taxation of capital gains and losses which
includes the question whether such gains and losses should be subject to the income
tax at all,, has been and will probably continue to be a perennial bone of controversy.
The issues involved are not partisan nor, strictly speaking, even political in character.
But they have given rise to deep and, at times, bitter differences of opinion, transcend-
ing party lines. The coitroversy is not new, although it has blazed hody in recent
years. It goes back almost to the beginning of federal taxation of incomes under the
authority of the Sixteenth Amendment, and so far antedates in point of time the
New Deal and New Deal fiscal policies.
Nor has the controversy been peculiarly an American one. This same set of
problems has arisen in other countries in which an income tax is an important part
of the revenue system. Differences of view similar to those which are evident in the
United States exist among students of fiscal problems and policies in these other
countries. While their solutions have differed in- some important respects from our
own, it does not appear that they have worked materially better or have given more
general satisfaction. The fact is that the conflicts of interest and of philosophical out-
look which are involved are probably too deep-seated to warrant optimism that a
solution will ever be found which will satisfy all the important groups and interests
affected.
The reason for the universality of these problems is not far to seek. It inheres in
the-necessity of defining the base to which an income tax is to apply. At the very
threshold fundamental differences between schools of economic thought with respect
to the concept of income itself are encountered. At least two basic and self-consistent
concepts of taxable income have won respectable followings: For convenience these
may be labeled the "dispositive" or "expenditure" concept and the "accrual" concept.
Neither concept, of course, furnishes an exact measure of true economic income
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THE CASE FOR TAXING CAPITAL GAINS
which includes too many intangible and impalpable psychical elements to be prac-
tical of use as a tax base.2 Any attempt to analyze and compare in detail these two
general c6nc;ptions would be out of place here. Suffice it to say that the "expendi
ture" concep.t largely eliminates savings from the tax base. Under it capital gains are
not income except to the extent they are spent during the taxable year, but the sam
is true, for that matter, of wages, interest, dividends, and other sources of gain. Capi-
tal losses are of no significance except to the extent they may actually operate to
restrict spending in future years.* Moreover, the familiar distinctions between income
and return of capital are of no relevance under the "expenditure" concept, since it is
the fact of spending, not the source of that which is spent, which-determines taxabil-
ity. Consequently, if the "expenditure" concept should ever be adopted, the capital
gain and loss problem would disappear.'
But there is small chance of any such radical change occurring in the foreseeable
future. Whatever its asserted advantages, the man in the street is unlikely to regard
as equitable or just, and therefore to accept, a fiscal system under which a wealthy
person of miserly disposition, whose fortune is increasing at a rapid rate year after
year, may pay less tax than an individual who is spending most of his salary, his
principal resource, to support his family. In any event, virtually every country with
an income tax has chosen to construct its tax base upon some form of the accrual
concept. From the beginning of the income tax the American people have regarded
it as equitable to apportion the tax burden among individuals according to what each
has been able to accumulate during the taxable year as well as the amount of his
spending. Except to the extent that favored treatment has from time to time been
extended to capital gains4 the definition of the personal income tax base has taken
a relatively neutral position as between saving and spending. It is true that the
personal exemptions and the credit for dependents are based upon the poliry of
exempting from taxation moderate amounts ordinarily required for necessary rms
of consumption and service. To that extent the law may be said in a practical sense
to favor expenditure. With this qualification, the tax base may be said roughly to
represent the amount of increase, if any, in net worth during the taxable year plus
the pecuniary value of personal and family consumption during such period.'
I Perhaps the ablest and most articulate of American proponents of the "expenditure" cncept has
been Dr. Irving Fisber.
' So, too, the problem of the taxation of corporations, including the treatment of .ndlstributed profits.
See Preliminary Report of the Committee of the Naiond Tax Aeda ion on Federa T a.gos of
Corporaiionr (1938) 17 et Jeq.
' While no statistical evidence has been found, it seems reasonable to suppose that a somewhat higher
percentage of capital gains of individuals is saved in some form than is the case with other important
sources of taxable income, such as wages and salaries, interest, rents, or even corporate dividends. In the
case of trusts, capital gains are very likely to be saved for legal reasons, sinci state laws usually require,
unless the trust instrument stipulates to the contrary, that capital gains shall not be distributed but shall
be added to corpus.
'SIMuoNs, P4so.AL. INcoMiE TAxA-ons (1938) 61, 62. "Accretion to net worth" mustb e interpreted,
in view of judicial interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court, to
include only reali:ed accretions, and not mere paper accruals representing unrealized appreciation in the
fair market value of asets. Even with this important limitation, the statement in the text is at best
only a crude approximation of the realities in individual cases, since it takes no account, inter auff, of the
196 LAW AND CONMIPORARY PROBLEM
Many-probably a majority-of those who advocate either the exclusion of so-
called capital gains and losses from the income tax base or a special and favored tax
treatment of capital gains, accept in -general the "accrial" concept of income and
would not favor a thoroughgoing shift to the value of spending or consumption as a
tax base. But for various reasons, chiefly supposed adverse economic repercussions
and effects, they insist that capital gains should not be taxed as ordinary income.
They are not agreed upon any particular method of taxation, but fall into three
general groups: (x) those who point to the British system as a model and favor the
complete exclusion of so-called casual or non-business capital gains from the income
tax base;' (2) those who believe that capital gains and losses should be completely
segregated into a separate basket or schedule and taxed either at a flat rate or under
graduated rates much more moderate than the rates applicable to "ordinary" in-
come;7 (3) the group which has had the greatest influence on legislative policy, con-
sisting of those who believe the capital gains represent to some extent tax-paying
ability and should pay some tax, but who believe that it is wise policy for economic
reasons to restrict the maximum effective rate of tax on capital gains to a moderate
percentage, such as
Before attempting to weigh on their merits the arguments pro and con for the
various points of view, it would be well to summarize briefly the evolution of
federal tax policy with respect to capital gains and losses in its vacillations and
permutations throughout the long series of revenue acts.' It may be noted also in
passing thaf a great majority of the states which have a tax on net income regard
capital gains as ordinary income, probably for the reason that the relative lowness
of the state rates has saved state legislatures from the pressure of those groups which
have been successful in influencing Congress to eliminate the application of the
higher surtax brackets to capital net gains.1*
various forms of tax-exempt income nor important sources of cnrichment, such as legacies, gifts, and
other gratuitous receipts, the constitutional status of which has never been adjudicated under the Sixteenth
Amendment because of the settled legislative policy to exclude them from statutory gross income.
*A leading proponent of this point of view is Mr. Morris Tremaine. See Tremaine TAe Cpiltd Gain
Tax (!937) 15 TAx MAGAZNK 517.
YThe clearest and most persuasive presentation of the case for segregation is found in an article by
L FL Parker, Capital Gins and Losses (x936) 14 Tax MAGNz 6o5.
•ror an exposition of this point of view, see Alvord, Capital G n and Undisributed Prfs Taves
(3938) z6 Tax Mw-%zmz z45-
'This summary takes account only of the personal income tax. As regards corporations, they were
taxed in full on their capital gains until 1932 and allowed to deduct all their capital losses. In 1'93a and
1933 the limitation with respect to losses on stocks and bonds applied. From 1932 to 1939, Corporate
capital gains were taxed in full, but from 1934 to z939, deduction of corporate =pital net losses was
limited to $2,000. Under the Revenue Act of z939, amending the Internal Revenue Code, capital gains
are taxed in full. In the case of corporations other than foreign personal holding companies and personal
holding companies, short-term capital losses are allowed as a deduction only to the extent of short-term
capital gains, with a one-year carry-over allowed for a net short-term capital loss, while a full deduction
is wisely allowed for long-term capital losses. However, a net long-term capital net loss is not allowed
to be included in computing the amount of the net operating loss carry-over happily restored to the
income tax lai' by as1 of the Revenue Act of 1939, Ix-. Rrv. CoDx, xaia.
* For an illuminating summary of the status of taxation of capital gains in the states, prepared as of
1938, see Table H in Report of Committee on Taxation of Capital Gainr, NAT. Tx Asas, PsocIEixos,
1938, p. 8o6, at pp. 8Si, 8s6.
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It should be observed at the outset that the statutory definition of capital gains
and losses has been quite uniform and stable throughout the years. In general, a
capital gain or loss has been defined as the difference between the realized selling
price and the cost of any asset 1 ' except stock in trade and, since the 1938 Act,
property of a kind subject to the statutory allowance for depreciation. Beginning
with the Revenue Act of 1933 certain losses formerly regarded as ordinary, viz.,
losses sustained in the taxable year on account of stock becoming worthless and
certain categories of bad debts (corporate bonds, notes, etc.) ascertained to have
become worthless during the taxable year and charged off, have been included in
the category of capital losses. Also in certain years the definition of capital asset
has excluded assets held for less than a specified minimum period, so that gains from
the sale or exchange thereof would constitute ordinary income, while losses there-
from were subjected to more or less arbitrary limitations as regards deductibility 12
From 1913 to 1921 capital gains were taxed as ordinary income, while prior to
1918 no deduction Of capital losses was -provided. From 1918 to 1921 capital losses
were deductible in full. Until the sharp increase in income tax rates which came
with the war, the capital gains controversy was relatively quiescent despite the
manifest unfairness of the early acts in allowing no deduction for capital losses.
After the conclusion of the war, as the result of a furious strhggle in Congress
during the consideration of the 1921 Act, that body was finally persuaded that the
very high rates of tax then in effect were obstructing the proper functioning of the
capital markets and the orderly marketing of capital assets. It was therefore provided
in the 1921 Act that the rate of tax on gains realized on capital assets held more than
two years should not exceed a maximum of 12/2%, while gains realized on assets
held less than two years should be taxed as ordinary income, presumably because
such gains were thought to be chiefly the result of speculative as distinguished from
investment transactions. The foregoing method of taxing capital gains, characterized
by a ceiling of 122%, remained in effect unchanged until the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1934, but the treatment of losses underwent several changes during
this period. Under the 1921 Act such losses were deductible in full, except if realized
on assets held less than two years. The 1924 Act made capital losses deductible in
full, except that, if realized on assets held over two years, they were limited in their
effect on the tax to 12Y% of the loss. Thus there was created a correlation between
the treatment of gains and losses and a superficial symmetry in the statute, but this
limitation on losses was defensible only f'rom the point of view of the revenue in
order to offset, at least in part, the concessions made with respect to gains, since the
taxpayers benefited by the generous treatment of gains were not necessarily the
same as those disadvantaged by the limitation on losses.
Save for certain additional limitations on losses on stocks and bonds held for less
"
5Jin certain cases, such as that of an asset owned on March x, 1913, the basis .may be other than
actual cost.
"' For a graphic table showing, this legislative history for the years up to and including 1938, see
Report of Committee on Taxation of Capital Gains, supra note zo, Table I, at p. 814.
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than two years,13 introduced by the Revenue Act of 1932, the above scheme remained
in effect for ten years, or until the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1934, when an
entirely new method of dealing with -capital gains and losses made its appearance.
Its principal features, other than certain unfortunate limitations with respect to the
deduction of capital losses which were the natural result of the critical need for
revenue and other conditions then existing, were two: (x) it ameliorated the anti-
progressive character of the earlier law by measurably reducing the advantages en-
joyed by individuals in the higher surtax brackets; (2) it brought the portion of the
capital gain taken into account into net income, where it was then taxed under
the same normal and surtax rates applicable to other forms of income. The per-
centage of gain or loss taken into account varied according to the length of time
the assets had been held, running from a maximum of xoo% per cent on assets held
for not more than one year, by rather sharp drops, to a minimum of 30% with respect
to assets held for more than ten years. Deduction of capital losses was limited to the
amount of the capital gains for the taxable year, plus not to exceed $2,ooo. These
percentage brackets were the product of an earnest effort to adjust the tax burden in
the yeqr of realization roughly to what it would have been if taxes had been paid
each year on the amount of the appreciation accruing in that year, assuming the
appreciatinn had taken place at a uniform rate throughout each year of the holding
period.
The 1934 scheme lasted for orly four years and went into the discard almost
completely when the capital gain and loss provisions again underwent radical surgery
in the Revenue Act of 1938. What was thought in 1934 to be the best feature of the
new method then adopted, viz., the device of the percentage brackets to offset the
inequities of the realization doctrine in the case of casual and intermittent gaing,
proved, ironically enough, its chief weakness in 1938 because of its alleged effect in
influencing artificially the holding and/or sale of securities. The 1938 scheme, with
certain additional admirable changes affecting only capital losses of corporations
in the Revenue Act of 1939, is still operative. In its main outlines, it closely resembles
the plan which was in effect for ten years or more prior to 1934 and which was
discardedas unsatisfactory by the Congress in that year.
Under this scheme, on the gain side, ioo% of the-gain is taxed as ordinary income
if the asset is held for less than x8 mbnths. But with respect to assets held for between
18 and 24 months, only 66%% of the gain can be taken into account, and the maxi-
mum tax cannot exceed 2o% of the total gain in such category, while in respect'of
assets held for over 24 months, only 50% of the gain is taken into account and the
maximum tax cannot exceed 15% of such total gain." This maximum rate of tax
on long-term capital net gains, 15 to 2o/ according to the holding period, is to be
contrasted to a possible maximum rate (normal and surtax) of 79% on other or
ordinary income under the present law, whereas during the greater part of the
decade prior to 1934 the then maximum rate of 12,4% on long-term capital gains
' Sece REvenue Act of 1932, § =2(r). 21,See 12nT. Rxv. Comz, 5S17(¢)(3).
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contrasted with a maximum rate (normal and surtax) of but 250/0. The 1938 Act
also liberalized greatly the treatment of losses. Short-term losses are deductible cndy
against short-term gains, but a carry-over of one year of short-term net losses is
provided. With respect to long-term losses the same percentages are taken into ac-
count as in the case of gains, except that the effect on the tax which the allowance of
such percentages may produce is the minimum rather than maximum.1j 5 That is,
the allowance of a long-term capital net loss cannot operate to reduce the tax other-
wise payable by more than 2o% of the full loss, in the case of an asset held from 18
to 24 months, or 15% of the full loss if held for over 2 4 months.
What are the principal arguments advanced in opposition to the inclusion of
capital gains in taxable net income and/or in support of the 1938 revision? The
first of them is that capital gain is not income at all and hence is not properly in-
cludable in an income tax schedule. This argument is hardly of sufficient importance
or merit to warrant extended rebuttal. It usually assumes as its major premise,
whether articulate or inarticulate, a definition or concept of income from which
capital gain has been conveniently excluded. It flies in the face of numerous decisions
by the United States Supreme Court defining the income upon which the Sixteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to levy an unapportioned tax as including gain
from the sale or exchange of capital assets. It is submitted that this interpretation
reflects credit upon the wisdom and good sense of the Court. Capital gains are in-
come because the layman thinks they are, whether such gains result from trans-
actions motiv ated primarily by speculative or investment considerations. Such gains
do not seem to differ in any essential respect from gains derived from other forms
of economic activity, when viewed from the point of view of ability to pay, the most
common ground of rationalization of graduated personal income taxes. It does not
alter these fundamental realities merely to call capital gains "accretions to capital" or
the like. As a matter of fact, it now appears that the Sixteenth Amendment was not
necessary to enable an unapportioned tax to be levied upon gains realized upon the
sale of assets,16 although, by virtue of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Com-
pany,17 the Amendment was necessary to enable such a tax to be laid.upon interest,
rent or dividends resulting from the ownership of such assets.
Another and much more weighty argument is that the taxation of capital gains
is inequitable because the appreciation in value of an asset realized by a sale or
exchange is often fictitious. Passing over the difficulties inherent in the concept of
realization-difficulties overshadowed, however, by those which would arise were
that concept to be wholly abandoned-it is true that appreciation in value may be
due to the action and interaction of a host of very dissimilar factors. Among these
may be mentioned changes in the purchasing price of the dollar, reflected in fluc-
tuations in the price levels of commodities; changes in the gold value of the monetary
unit resulting from devaluation or other measures of national fiscal policy; accretions
due in whole or in part to the passage of time, such as growth of crops or the de-
. 2 2 1 57 -. S. 429 (1895);. x58 U. S. 6ox (x895).
"Scee id. 5117(c)('2)-
:reWillcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 (1931).
200 LAW AND CONTEMPOPLY PROBLEMS
velopment of new processes; accumulation of corporate earnings, reflected in the
higher market value of corporate securities; changes in the relative value of property
due to factors beyond the owner's- control,, which are reflected either in partial
obsolescence or unearned increment; and discounting of anticipated increase in
earnings. It is apparent that the significance of appreciation in value, from the point
of view of ability to pay, varies widely according to which of these factors such
ippreciation is attributable" 8
But it can scarcely be denied that. gains which result from appreciation for which
factors other than changes in the purchasing power or gold content of the dollar are
responsible are real gains and afford a true measure of ability to pay. It is to be
regretted that practical considerations seem to exclude allowance for monetary fluc-
tuations in the computation of capital gains and losses.1 ' But the overwhelming
difficulties in practical administration which would flow from any thorough-going
attempt to allow for monetary fluctuations in -the computation of taxable net income
are too obvious to require elaboration here.2 0 While monetary instability and the
resulting fluctuation of price levels undoubtedly interfere with the equitable opera-
tion of highly graduated surtaxes on annual incomes, these are problems which must
be solved, if at all, on their own ground and not by tinkering with the tax laws.
Furthermore, it is incontestable that a rigid system of computing net income and
net losses on an annual basis works as serious inequity and hardship in many other
situations as in the case of irregular or fortuitous capital gains and losses. Instances
of this not uncommon situation are the professional man reporting on the cash basis
and receiving in one year a very large fee for winning a case on which he has worked
for several years, or the author or composer who receives large royalties for a year
- or so from a best seller, or other cases where incomes are temporarily inflated through
the receipt of rewards for services having greater or less social value. Surely such
cases weigh at least as heavily in the scales of equity as those of individuals who
derive a large gain through the employment of capital in a fortunate investment or
speculation. It would seem wiser policy to seek mitigation of such inequities gen-
erally by perfecting devices for averaging fluctuating incomes over a period,2 1 thus
levelling off the hills and valleys, than to single out a particular form of income or
* gain, and, without regard to its real or fictitious character, to subject it to a. highly
preferential rate.
The.fiscal policies of other countries, principally Great Britain, France, and Ger-
"For a brilliant analysis of capital gains, going to the heart of this matter, see Simons, op. cd. supra
note 5, at 150-15r.
" That courts will not assume the responsibility of attempting to correct such inequalities is demon-
strated by the recent case of Batet v. United States, xo8 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1939), crt. den.
6o Sup. Ct. 591 (1940), where the court held that no effect could be given to the statutory change
in the gold content of the dollar in computing the taxable profit on a sale in z935 of securities purchased
prior to devaluation during z93z to 1933.
:6 For a good discussion of these difficulties, see SimosS, op. dt. supra note 5, at 155 e seq.
'Congress made a cautious but nevertheless interesting experiment in the -939 Act in providing
in certain cases for what is in effect an averaging over a period of earned income -eceived in one year for
services or work extending over a period of at least five calendar years. See Revenue Act of 1939, 5220,
inserting S1o7 in the Internal Revenue Code.
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many, are often pointed to as evidence of the unwisdom of Congress in subjecting
capital gains to an income tax burden. No doubt we can learn from the experience
of other countries. But persons advancing this argument seldom, if ever, recognize
that there is no more agreement as to fundamental principles in these countries than
in our own, and that they seem to be no more happy in their solutions of the problem
than ourselves. Yet a casual listener to much of the discussion of this problem
among some Americans might well be pardoned for thinking that the British had
achieved Utopia because in that country casual capital gains are, like accretions to
capital, excluded from the tax base.
A good corrective to so superficial a view is provided by Dr. R. M. Haig's clear
and dispassionate critical examination of the systems of these three countries.?2
Summarizing the English situation, Dr. Haig writes:
It has been shown: (i) that the exemption of capital gains in England is far narrower
than it is commonly conceived to be; (2) that the partial exemption of capital gains under
their law involves drawing an arbitrary line between taxable and exempt transactions, with
uncertain and inequitable results as between individuals in substantially similar circum-
stances; (3) that the British themselves are far from satisfied with their formula, a Royal
Commission having gone so far as to declare that "it cannot be justified"; (4) that the
formula places a premium on the transformation of taxable income into exempt capital
gains, a premium sufficiently substantial to give rise to tax avoidance and loss of revenue
in spite of England's superior administration and her high degree of taxpayer cooperation;
and (5) that the devices for tax avoidance cause investors to buy and sell securities at
"unnatural tumes," with consequences for the market that may be expected to. be
accentuated under American conditions.
Dr. Haig's observations make it unnecessary to point out the disastrous possibil-
ities involved in the incorporation into our law of exemptions of capital -gains coex-
tensive with those of the British law, when American psychology and conditions are
taken into account. The basic structure of the French law is very similar to the
British, but lax French administration appears to have made even the tax on specula-
tive profits a dead letter there, while the exclusion of so-called investment gains and
the inclusion of so-called speculative profits in the tax base in Germany have worked
apparently only because of perfectly artificial and arbitrary, if simple, statutory rules
for determining which gains are includable as speculative profits. It is accordingly
quite arguable, so far as tax treatment of capital gains and losses is concerned, that
the evolution of American law, however uncertain and vacillating it has been, has
manifested a sounder trend than the comparable development of the statutory law
in these other, countries.
It is commonly asserted that the revenue would suffer no net loss and perhaps
even a gain over the full period of an economic cycle, if a policy were adopted of
complete exemption of capital gains, other than those realized in the form of business
profits and, perhaps, those arising from speculative transactions (in practice, this
would necessarily mean gains from assets held for a relatively short period). How-
22 Taxation ol Capita! Gd -. , a series of articles appCring in the Wall Street lounal in lames between
March 23 and April 13, 1937.
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ever this may be,W 3 it does not follow that such an exemption would represent sound
policy. Important as revenue productivity is and must be, such productivity cannot
safely be made the sole or conclusive -criterion of the relative merit of alternative
schemes. No one would seriously suggest eliminating all the deductions and credits
allowed under the present law, merely because such action would undoubtedly
balance the federal budget, at least for a year. The prime justification for, and the
chief point of superiority of, a graduated personal income tax is that it, more than
any other tax save perhaps graduated estate and inheritance taxes, achieves an
allocation of the tax burden among individuals upon a .progressive basis and in
rough accordance with ability to pay. The entire or partial exclusion, from the tax
base of a particular category of real gains and losses inevitably creates a serious inter-
ference with its operation in this respect, and thereby tends to impair the superiority
of the tax and destroy its chief raison d'etre.
Another weighty fact which it is not wise to ignore is that preferential treatment
of capital gains, as compared with earned income, business profits, and periodic
investment income, tends to aggravate certain refractory problems of tax avoidance,
and creates incentive to resort to new forms of avoidance. It thereby endangers the
integrity of the income tax as a whole. The Treasury statistics show that, on the
average, 85% of the capital gains reported in income returns ii derived from sale
and exchange of stock and securities. It seems safe to assume that much the larger
part of this 85% is referable to equity securities. While other factors play a material
part, this appreciation in the value of corporate equities is in substantial measure the
result of accumulation of corporate earnings. Such retention of corporate profits
swells corporate surplus and enhances the value of the assets underlying the securi-
ties. It requires no high degree of wisdom to see that, the greater the tax preference
which capital gains enjoy, the larger the incentive to retention of corporate earnings
becomes.
A system of income taxation which included in the tax base gains from whatever
source derived, without discrimination on the basis of source, would remove the
principal tax incentives for accumulation of corporate earnings in surplus. With the
maximum tax liability upon capital gains under the existing law hardly a fifth of
the maximum tax upon corporate earnings distributed as dividends, it is difficult to
believe that corporate shareholders will not prefer, as time goes on, to realize their
-profits on corporate investment, so far as practicable, through the sale or exchange
of his shares at a profit created by the retention of corporate earnings rather than
through the receipt of dividends out of such earnings. Since the abandonment of
the undistributed profits tax in the Revenue Act of 1939, Section 10224 remains as
the only statutory sanction to discourage this practice, except for the special pro-
" The statistics of revenue do not bea out this contention, but no conclusive answer appears to be
possible upon the basis of facts now precisely ascertainable. Much would depend, no doubt, upon the
generosity or niggardliness of the allowances for loises.
".Internal Revenue Code, S102, impose a substantial surtax upon the undistributed net incomes of
corporations formed or availed of to evade surtaxes upon their shareholders by permitting earnings to
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business.
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visions applicable only to the limited class of corporations constituting personal hold-
ing companies or foreign personal holding companies. It remains to be seen whether
this section, the application of which depends on motive, will prove equal to the
great demands now put upon it. Fortunately the great majority of corporations at
present seem to be following the wise course of determining their dividend policies
without regard to tax considerations.
Methods of segregating capital gains and losses into a separate schedule, whether
such segregation be complete as Mr. Parker has suggested or partial, as under the
existing revenue laws, seem to assume that a line of demarcation between capital
gain and other income can be drawn with a high degree of precision. Unfortunately,
such an assumption is far from corresponding with fact. We cannot talk about
capital gain and ordinary income as if we are dealing with tight and mutually
exclusive categories, for there happens to be a disturbing variety of devices for trans-
muting what would otherwise be ordinary income into capital gain. Foremost
among these are the various uses to which the corporate entity may be put, such as
the accumulation of earnings and profits in a corporation, followed at a time con-
venient to the shareholders by complete liquidation. A few others which may be
mentioned are the sale of stocks before dividend date cum dividend and their sub-
sequent repurchase ex dividend, a practice which became so prevalent in England as
to force' action by Parliament, action which has proved of doubtful efficacy; issue or
purchase of bonds carrying a low rate of interest but selling at a discount, followed
by sale thereof at or close to par just prior to maturity; and even issue of bonds, at a
heavy discount, carrying a nominal rate of interest or no interest
With surtax rates on other income running up to the present maximum of 75%,
it is quite apparent that the preference in favor of capital gains under the existing
law is such as to create a great incentive for tax avoidance through such transmuta-
tions of ordinary income into capital gain. How much greater would such incentive
be were capital gains to be completely exempted from taxation. Undoubtedly Con-
gress would be confronted in due course with problems of tax avoidance even more
refractory to legislative solution than the foreign personal holding company and other
devices which resulted in Supplement P and other complicated provisions of the
Reveiue Act of 1937.
It is urged that even the partial inclusion of capital gains and losses in the tax
base necessitates many complexities in the income tax law, such as ihe provisions
relating to nori-recognition of gain or loss and to basis. This argument overlooks at
least two important facts. The first of these is that many basis provisions would still
be necessary to provide yardsticks for measuring allowances for depreciation, obsoles-
cence and depletion; the other that many new provisions, probably more complicated
and technical than those eliminated, would soon be found necessary in order to
sterilize the many new devices of tax avoidance, samples of which are given above,
which American ingenuity would evolve.
It is sometimes urged, with a degree of truth, that severe practical hardship may
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often result from taxing capital gain, because such gain may be realized in con-
templation of law in cases where, by reason of the form in which such gain accrues,
the result of realization is to saddle-the taxpayer with a tax liability although he has
received nothing but assets which may. be frozen or semi-frozen with which to pay;
also that he may be compelled to pay a tax although he has done no more than to
alter the form of his investment, the value remaining unchangedY2 Such objections,
to the extent they possess merit, do not present real issues of principle. Congress has
not been niggardly in extending statutory relief in such cases through the familiar
devices of non-recognition of gain or loss and substitution of basis. There are, of
course, limits beyond which this principle of non-recognition cannot safely be carried,
even where gain is realized in a form other than money or a highly liquid security.26
There still remains to be considered the argument for highly preferential tax
treatment of capital gains, or even their complete exemption, which has been most
plausibly and forcefully advanced. It is the argument which has undoubtedly carried
the greatest popular appeal, both in and out of Congress. The substance of this
argument is that the economic effects of capital gains taxation are peculiarly bad, in
that the impact of high surtax rates upon capital gains freezes the capital market,
and impedes or prevents the investment of capital in new enterprises where risk is
involved, thereby hampering industrial expansion and fostering unemployment. It
is furthermore said that a capital gains tax creates artificial and unhealthy conditions
in the securities marketsby interference with the free transfer of securities, thereby
aggravating both inflationary booms and deflationary collapses. Several writers have
gone so far as to assert that the capital gains tax is a prime or even principal cause of
cyclical booms and depressions.2 7
These assertions are made in face of the fact that stock market panics and
business booms and depressions antedated the ratification of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment. Moreover, it is a familiar fact that a decade in which the maximum rate of
tax on capital gains was xi2 %, scarcely an oppressive or paralyzing tax burden,
nevertheless culminated in the most catastrophic stock market collapse and the
beginning of the most devastating economic debacle in our national history. It is one
of the ironic facts of history that, although this x2V% rate was often denounced as
an intolerable burden on capital and the capital markets during the 1920's, its
approximate restoration was hailed as one of the best guarantees of recovery during
=s Such hardship at its worst can scarcely exceed that which may flow from the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Helvering v. Bruun, 6o Sup. Ct. 631 (1940), reversing ios F. (ad) 442 (C. C. A. 8th).
In this case the Court finally ended a twenty-year period of confusion and uncertainty by holding that, in
cases where a lessee makes improvements upon the leasehold, the lessor derives income--apparently
ordinary income--in the year of terminaiion of the lease, to the extent of the fair value of the improve-
ments in such year. The decision seems sound in principle. Yet it is apparent that a lessor, whose other
resources are limited, may be hard put to it to pay the tax where the value of the improvements, such as
an office building, is very large.
" An instance is the short-lived provision of the Revenue Act of i921, 5ao2(c), allowing exchange of
stock or securities without recognition of gain even though such exchange was not pursuant to a tax-free
reorganization. Congress quickly realized the too great liberality of this provision.
" Tremaine, The Capital Gains Tax (1937) 35 Tx MAGAzmNE, 517; Fisher, A Practical Schedute for
an Income Tax (1937) 15 id. 379.
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the successful drive for revision of the capital gains tax in z938. It is unnecessary to
point out that the i2YA% maximum rate gave no relief whatever with respect to
capital gains realized by taxpayers in the lower tax brackets.
The most cogent answer to the charge that the capital gains tax is a major cause
of booms and depressions is given in the Report of the Committee on Taxation of
Capital Gains of the National Tax Association in I938?8 It is there well said:
Mr. Tremaine overlooks the fact that in boom times it is primarily the speculator who
is realizing capital gains. In the hands of speculators these gains can only aggravate
market conditions, since they will almost certainly be used further to inflate the security
market. Even "unwise" investments by governent would be preferable to this course for
the money would be retired from the security. iarkets and placed where it would help to
improve the general price structure.
What has been said above, however, does not meet the criticism levelled at the
tax treatment of capital gains under the Revenue Act of x934 on the ground that its
effect was to discourage wealthy individuals from embarking their capital upon new
enterprises. It is undoubtedly true that large scale ventures into new fields cannot
commonly look to public financing to provide their capital requirements, and that
the great majority of such ventures require one or more men of large means who
are willing to take the risks which are involved. What has been termed the "enter-
prise capital" provided by such individuals unquetionably performs a highly useful
and even essential economic and social service. Such individuals are the very ones
best fitted to assume the risks new enterprises necessarily involve. But it is contended
that the prospect that much of the gains, if the enterprise pr6ves successful, will go
to the tax collector, while the losses, if the venture fails, will be allowed only in part
as a deduction against taxable income, removes most of the incentive for such
enterprise capital.
This contention, so far as the gains aspect is concerned, ignored one vital fact
with respect to the rate structure of the Y934 Act.2 That rate structure really offered
to wealthy individuals a very strong inducement to make their new investments
precisely in such manner as would cause their returns to take the form of capital
gains. Under that act, if an asset had been held for over ten years, the maximum
effective rate on the actual gain from its sale would be only 23.7%, as compared with
"Report of Committee on Taxation of Capital Gains, supra note 8, at 809. The author finds him-
self in general agreement with the content and conclusions of this report and agrees that a fair and
adequate solution must ultimately be found in some not too cornpiex device of averaging operating
over at least a five-year period.
"Space. does not permit consideration of policy in the matter of taxation of capital gains in the light
of facts developed in the hearings of the Temporary National Economic Committee withr respect to present
conditions of supply and demand in the enterprise capital market. That the findings of this investigation
may have a profound bearing upon future national policy in the tax field, as well as other fields, is obvious.
It may also be suggested that the elimination of future issuance of tax-exempt securities might have
a more profound and lasting ultimate effect in unfreezing enterprise capital than a return to anti-
progressive principles of personal taxation can ever do.
The developments in the capital market since the Revenue Act of 1938 can scarcely be said to lend
support to those who asserted prior to its enactment that the capital gains and losses provisions of the
1934 Act were the principal obstacle to the revival of large-scale capital investment.
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a top rate of 79% on other income; while if held for over five years the comparable
rate would be 31.6% against 79P. Even so the discrimination as between taxpayers
in the low and high surtax brackets wis much less invidious under the x934 Act than
under prior laws.
The following examples will show concretely the extent of this tax.induccment
in the 1934 Act: Assume an individual with other surtax income of $aooooo who
has Si,ooo,ooo to invest. Under the rates prescribed by the x936 Act, if he can find
an investment which, over a period of ten years, will return him a capital gain
averaging only 5/s per annum, compounded annually, he would discover upon
calculation that his net return, after taxes, would be equivalent to 12.80/0 annual yield
on an ordinary income-producing investment. He would find that over a period of
five years he would need to obtain an annual yield of 11.5% from an ordinary income-
producing investment to equal the net return, after taxes, that he might obtain
through a capital gain averaging only 5% per annum. Even on an investment for
only one year (one day should be added to each of these periods), a 50/ capital gain
would give him just as large a return after taxes as a 7.1% yield in interest, dividends,
rents or royalties.
Similarly, a capital gain averiaging o% per annum, compounded annually, would
give him the equivalent, after taxes, of annual yields of fully taxable income of
27.7%, 24..6y and 14.50/ respectively, according as he held the capital gain investment
for just over ten, five or one years. He would need a capital gain a:eraging only
x.50/ per annum, compounded annually, over a period of ten years, to obtain the
same net income, after taxes, that he would derive from a 3% bond; and even
over a period of only one year and a day, a capital gain of 2V7% would equal his net
yield after taxes from a 3'/z% bond, etc.
It is quite possible, however, that the limitations on losses which the i934 Act
contained operated as a marked deterrent to new and hazardous investment. But
these defects could have been easily ameliorated or removed without abandoning the
worth-while features of that act and returning to an essentially unprogressive system,
so far as the treatment of gains is concerned. The liberalization in the allowance for
capital net losses in the Revenue Act of 193830 and the provisions which ameliorate
the discrimination in the treatment of the capitl gains of taxpayers whose net in-
comes fall into the lower surtax brackets aie sound and admirable. These features
may well be preserved and extended. The restoration of fair and logical treatment.
of the capital losses of partnerships by the 1938 Act is another praiseworthy feature. L
In conclusion, it is submitted that we should apply our best intelligence to finding
"It is argued by some that there is nothing unfair or arbitrary in the provisions of the 1934 Act
narrowly limiting the deduction of capital net losses from ordinary income. It is said that such losses
do not presently diminish ability to pay, whatever their effect in future years may be. This may be true,
but it does not shake the writer's conviction that it is bad policy in the long run to tax capital gains in
the same manner as other income and at the same time arbitrarily limit deduction of capital losses. The
majority of taxpayers regard such a tax policy as inconsistent and unjust. Moreover, such loss limitations
may well hinder the financing of new and hazardous enterprises
*'INsr. R-v. CoDE, §Sxa, x83.
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a fiscal system which will at the same time maintain sound principles of progressive
taxation of income wiL-thout discrimination on account of source and reduce to a
minimum the inequities which inhere in the doctrines of realization and the com-
putation of income on an annual basis. Such a solution will probably involve more
liberal treatment of losses and the averaging of income over a longer period than
we have ever attempted. Equity having been achieved in these respects, capital
gains should be included in the income base and taxed at progressive rates without
preference. How high such rates should be graduated presents controversial issues of
policy outside the field of the present discussion. But the question may well be asked,
if it be true that the rates of tax are now graduated so high that their non-dis-
criminatory application to capital gains would be a major cause of depression and
unemployment and would be a menace to the perpetuation of a system of free
enterprise, why the application of the same. rates to wages and salaries, business
profits, interest, dividends, and other fruits of economic activity should have less
dangerous or detrimental results?
